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DOES A PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT
NOTICE EVER TAKE LAND IN INDIANA
SUBJECT TO AN UNRECORDED
DEFEASANCE?
CHARLES C. BAKER*
The preseit Indiana Statutes relating to the recordation of
instruments affecting the title to land are traceable to Chapter
23 of I Revised Statutes-1852. On page 233, section 11 is set
forth as follows:
"No conveyance of any real estate in fee simple, or for life, or of any
future estate, and no lease for more than three years from the making
thereof, shall be valid and effectual against any person other than the
grantor, his heirs and devisees, and persons having notice thereof, unless
it is made by a deed recorded within the time and in the manner provided
in this act."
On page 234, section 16 is set forth as follows:
"Every conveyance or mortgage of lands, or of any interest therein,
and every lease for more than three years, shall be recorded in the record-
er's office of the county where such lands shall be situated; and every
such conveyance or lease not so recorded within ninety days from the exe-
cution thereof, shall be fraudulent and void as against any subsequent
purchaser or mortgagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration."
On page 235, section'17 is set forth as follows:
"When a deed purports to contain an absolute conveyance of any estate
in lands, but is made, or intended to be made, defeasible by force of a
deed of defeasance, bond, or other instrument for that purpose, the original
conveyance shall not thereby be defeated or affected as against any
person other than the maker of the defeasance, or his heirs or devisees,
or persons having actual notice thereof, unless the instrument of defeasance
shall have been recorded, according to law, within ninety days after the
date of said deed."
Neither section 11 nor section 17 as above set forth have been
amended. They are now found as sections 13390 and 13393 re-
spectively in Burns Revised Statutes of 1926.
The above section 16, however, has undergone four changes
since 1852. The first amendment is found in the Acts of 1875,
Chapter 62, page 94, and provided in effect that conveyances,
mortgages and leases should be recorded within forty-five days
from the time of their execution. The second, third, and fourth
* See p. 622 for biographical note.
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amendments are found in the Acts of 1913, 1921, and 1923 re-
spectively. The changes effected in 1921 and 1923 are imma-
terial to the present discussion and we may properly say that
the present form of this section dates from Chapter 82, page
233 of the Acts of 1913. As amended section 16 of Chapter 23
of I Revised Statutes 1852 is now found as section 13391 Burns
1926 as follows:
"Every conveyance or mortgage of lands or of any interest therein,
and every lease for more than three years, shall be recorded in the record-
er's office of the county where such lands shall be situated; and every
conveyance, mortgage or lease shall take priority according to the time
of the filing thereof, and such conveyance, mortgage or lease shall be
fraudulent and void as against any subsequent purchaser, lessee or mort-
gagee in good faith and for a valuable consideration, having his deed,
mortgage or lease first recorded."
Section 16 of the Revised Statutes of 1852 and the Amend-
ment of 1875, each containing provisions for a period of time
within which a deed, mortgage or lease should be recorded, were
similar to recording statutes enacted in many other states at
about the same time.' Bad roads, isolated farming communities,
and the more leisurely commercial practices of those times did
not make for a public policy that would demand a race to the
court house as a factor in determining priority among grantees,
mortgagees, and lessees. Substantially, the effect of such pro-
visions was that if an instrument were recorded within the time
limited it would be effective as against all persons as of the date
of its execution and delivery, and that if it were not recorded
within the time limited it would be effective as against subse-
quent purchasers for value without notice only as of the date
of recording.- The operation of section 16 may be seen from
the following assumed situation. A, the owner of certain land,
by deed conveys his land to B on April 1. On April 30 A by
deed conveys the same land to C who has no knowledge or notice
of the prior transaction and who gives a valuable consideration
-or his deed. Immediately and on April 30 C records his deed.
Under this set of facts B's deed would nevertheless take priority
over C's deed providing B placed his deed on record on or before
I "Jones on Mortgages"-7th Edition; Sec. 458.
2 "Jones on Mortgages"-7th Edition; Sec. 458.
Carson v. Eickhoff, 148 Ind. 596.
Meni v. Rathbone, 21 Ind. 454.
Trisler v. Trisler, 38 Ind. 282.
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June 30 under the statutes of 1852, or on or before May 16 under
the amendment of 1875. The same principle held true as to
mortgages and leases for more than three years.
This situation gave rise to the following practice on the part
of certain grantees and lessees, and more especially on the part
of mortgage loan companies engaged in the business of lending
money on mortgages. After receiving the deed, lease or mort-
gage such persons would immediately place the instrument on
record. They would then wait ninety days under the act of
1852 or forty-five days under the amendment of 1875. At the
end of this time they would make a search of the records in
order to learn if prior instruments had been recorded. If the
search showed that no prior instruments had been recorded they
would then pay over the consideration for the grant or the
mortgage moneys.
It has been supposed that the amendment of 1913 eliminated
all necessity for the cautious investor to wait for the expiration
of any statutory period of time before paying the consideration
to the grantor, lessor, or mortgagor. It has been supposed that
the investor need not worry about the possibility of any un-
recorded instruments taking priority over his recorded instru-
ment if he himself had no knowledge of such unrecorded instru-
ment, if he gave a valuable consideration for the grant or
mortgage, and if he immediately placed his instrument on record.
It would seem that neither section 16 of the Revised Statutes
of 1852 or any of the four amendments thereto in any manner
relate to or affect the recording of instruments of defeasance.
Although in the absence of section 17 the language of section 16
might possibly be construed from the use of the words "con-
veyance," "mortgage," and "lease" to include a "defeasance,"
it must be clear when section 17 is considered in connection
with section 16 that the legislature intended no such inclusion.
The legislature must have regarded a "defeasance" as some-
thing entirely different from a "conveyance," "mortgage," or
"lease" and not to be included in section 16 because section 17
relating solely to "defeasances" was enacted as a separate sec-
tion to immediately follow section 16.
For the purposes of this inquiry it is unnecessary to consider
pro and con the kinds of instruments which may be classified
as "defeasances" within the meaning of section 17 and which
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may or may not be recorded under this section. 3 No case has
been found squarely on this point, but dicta seem to indicate
that an instrument providing that the grant should be void on
the happening of an event, 4 an agreement to reconvey on the
happening of an event, and a declaration of trust6 may all be
recorded under and are defeasances within the meaning of this
section. In the majority of the cases found the defeasance or
agreement made the entire transaction one of mortgage, and
as the cases for the most part involved as parties only the
grantor and the grantee the effect as to third persons of record-
ing or lack of recording was not an issue.
Seven Indiana cases have been found where the owner con-
veyed land and took back a defeasance or agreement to recon-
vey, the defeasance or agreement not being recorded, where the
issue in some way involved the rights of the original grantor
and a third person. In two cases 7 a purchaser from the grantee
for value and without notice of the agreement for reconveyance
took title to the land free of the agreement. In another case s
the grantee conveyed to a third person who had no notice of
3 The following cases seem to indicate that a true defeasance must con-
tain language substantially to the effect that the grant shall be void if the
grantor pays a certain sum of money or performs certain acts within a
certain time,-in contrast with an agreement whereby the grantee agrees
to reconvey in the event that the grantor pays a certain sum of money or
performs certain acts within a certain time. Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind.
537; Sinclair v. Gunzerhauser, 179 Ind. 78; Raub v. Lemon, 61 Ind. App.
59.
To the writer these cases do not make clear whether the difference
between a so-called technical defeasance and an agreement to reconvey is
one of substance or of procedure. It would seem that in the case of a
technical defeasance the title revests in the grantor on the happening of
the event stated, while in the case of an agreement to reconvey the grantor
would have as his remedy a bill for specific performance which, being in
equity, would be subject to the defense of laches, innocent purchaser for
value, etc.
Quere: Is the grantor's right in the first case legal, the deed and
defeasance together being in the nature of a grant on condition, and if so,
and in the absence of recording statutes, could the doctrine of innocent
purchaser for value apply?
4 Raub v. Lemon, 61 Ind. App. 59; Sinclair v. Guxzenhauser, 179 Ind.
78; Ferguson v. Boyd, 169 Ind. 537.
A Crassen v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 427.
6 Weeks v. Hathaway, 45 Ind. App. 196.
7 Crassen v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 427; Loeb v. McAlister, 15 Ind. App.
643.
8 Wilson P. Wilson, 86 Ind. 472.
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the defeasance but who gave no value, and the original grantor
prevailed over the third person, the court reading into section
17 the word "volunteer." In another case9 the grantee con-
veyed to X who had notice of the agreement and who gave no
value. X conveyed to Y who gave value but who had notice of
the agreement. The original grantor prevailed over Y. In an-
other case X obtained a judgment against the grantee and filed
a transcript in the county in which the land was located. X sold
the judgment to Y who gave value and who had no notice of the
grantor's right. Y prevailed over the original grantor. In an-
other case" the facts are not entirely clear but the court indi-
cates that a purchaser from the grantee for value and without
notice would take free of the agreement to reconvey. In another
case12 after the grant and agreement to reconvey, X, a stranger,
went into possession and then conveyed to Y who gave value and
had no notice. The original grantor prevailed over Y.
The writer has found no case where the effect of recording: a
defeasance has been decided. Section 17 in substance says,
"When a deed . . is made . . . defeasible . . by
force of . . . instrument for that purpose . . . the orig-
inal conveyance shall not thereby be defeated as against
(purchasers for value without notice) unless the
instrument of defeasance shall have been recorded . . . within
ninety days after the date of said deed." The section does not
say that a defeasance shall be effective if recorded but merely
says that it will not be effective unless recorded. 13 Nevertheless
the meaning must be clear that it shall be effective if recorded,
for otherwise the section would be entirely meaningless. 14
9 Weeks v. Hathaway, 45 Ind. App. 196.
10 Tuttle v. Churchman, 74 Ind. 311.
11 The Greenwood Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Stanton, 28 Ind. App. 548.
12 Parker v. Humble, 75 Ind. 580.
13 Section 17 is worded after the manner of sections 11 and 16 where
legal relationships are created and where in the absence of recording
statutes transfers rank according to time. Tiffany "Modern Law of Real
Property" section 475. If defeasances create mere equitable rights in the
grantor (see Jones on Mortgages, 7th Ed. sec. 241-242-244) should not the
statute providing for their recordation merely have provided that their
recording should give constructive notice?
14 Opinions which cite section 17 seem to take for granted that the
defeasance is effective if recorded. Weeks v. Hathaway, 45 Ind. App. 196;
Crassen v. Swoveland, 22 Ind. 427; Wilson v. Wilson, 86 Ind. 472. See
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As the period of time within which a defeasance should be
recorded under section 17 (ninety days) is identical with the
period of time within which a conveyance, mortgage or lease
should be recorded under section 16, the legislature by enacting
sections 11, 16, and 17 of Chapter 23 of the I Revised Statutes
of 1852 must have intended to create a well-rounded and uni-
form method of and time for recording instruments affecting
the title to real estate. As, under section 17, a defeasance is
void as against subsequent purchasers for value without notice
unless recorded within ninety days of the execution of the deed
it is to defeat; and as under section 16 a conveyance, mortgage
or lease not recorded within ninety days from the date of its
execution was void as against subsequent purchasers or mort-
gagees for value without notice,-it would seem that the ninety
day provision in section 17 should apply in the same manner as
did the ninety day provision in section 16.15 If this is true, a
defeasance, recorded within ninety days after the date of the
execution of the deed it was intended to defeat, would relate
back as of the date of the execution of such deed and be effective
as against all persons acquiring an interest in the land subse-
quent to that date.
As an example of the practical working of section 17 let us
assume the following situation. A, the owner of land worth
$6,000, borrows $1,000 from B and as security for the loan con-
veys the land by deed to B on February 1. At the same time
B executes and delivers to A a separate defeasance which re-
cites the deed and the indebtedness and provides either that the
deed shall be void or that B shall reconvey if A repays the
$1,000 with interest on or before two years from date. B im-
mediately records the deed. On April 15 B fraudulently mort-
gages the property to C who knows nothing of the defeasance,
for the sum of $5,000. C records the mortgage on April 15.
Later, on April 25, A records the instrument of defeasance. It
is submitted that under these facts the defeasance held and
recorded by A would take priority over the mortgage held by C.
If the conclusions arrived at are correct, it would seem that
also Cogan v. Cook, 22 Minn. 137, where under a similar statute the de-
feasance was recorded but was not acknowledged.
15 "Jones on Mortgage"--7th Edition; Sec. 458.
Carson v. Eickhoff, 148 Ind. 596.
Men! v. Rathbone, 21 Ind. 454.
Trisler v. Trisler, 38 Ind. 282.
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the cautious person who is about to accept a deed, mortgage or
lease to land that had previously been conveyed within ninety
days should wait until such ninety day period had elapsed before
paying over the consideration. He should then make a search
of the record to assure himself that a defeasance had not been
recorded in the meantime. He could then and only then pay
over the consideration for the grant, mortgage or lease with
the assurance that he was not taking his instrument subject to
a defeasance.16
16 In the above situation C, before completing his transaction with B,
might insist that B furnish him with an affidavit to the effect that he (B)
did not take the deed from A subject to a defeasance. This might sub-
ject B to a charge of perjury but surely could not affect the rights of A.
A similar affidavit made by A might estop A from setting up the de-
feasance against C. Quere: Could an affidavit by A to the affect that
the grant from A to B was indefeasible work an estoppel against a third
person who had previously obtained the defeasance from A by assign-
ment? Quere as to the effect of a release or quitclaim deed from A to C
on rights of a third person who previously had obtained the defeasance
from A by assignment? Would the form of the defeasance ("technical
defeasance" in contrast to agreement to reconvey) affect the answer to
the last quere?
